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INTE:I{NATIONAL LAW AND RELIGION IN 
LATIN AMERICA: THE BEAGLE 
CHANNEL DISPUTE 
M.C. Mirow* 
We have accepted your suggestion of mediation, 
but for the Argentine Republic the only mediator 
possible is his Holiness the Pope. 1 
With these words, in 1978, an Argentine diplomat proposed 
a method of defusing a territorial dispute that very nearly 
sparked off a war between Argentina and Chile. It.was an offer 
calculated to be rejected by Chile, and yet Chile's immediate 
response was "Agreed" - a response so unthinkable to Argen-
tina that within hours its military Junta revoked the power of the 
Foreign Minister and the President fo sign the agreement it had 
just proposed. In December 1978, the countries were quickly 
moving towards a war that, if waged, would most likely have 
engulfed much of Latin America. The Vatican, however, inter-
vened and brought peace between the parties.2 
Today, outside the countries involved, few remember the 
Beagle Channel dispute because it was successfully negotiated 
to a peaceful solution. The dispute has been recounted in sev-
* Associate Professor of Law and founding faculty member, Florida Interna-
tional University College of Law, Miami; Ph.D. (law), Leiden University; Ph.D. 
(law), Cambridge University; J.D., Cornell University; B.A., Boston University. He is 
the author of LATIN AMERICAN LA,v: A HtsTORY OF PRIVATE LA\V AND lNsTITU-
TIONs IN SPANISH AMERICA (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2004). The author 
thanks Prof. Dr. A. Wijffels (Leiden/Louvain-la-Neuve) who provided the concept of 
this article and whose constant encouragement is greatly appreciated. Thanks are also 
due to Steven Harper for his excellent research assistance. 
1. Argentine Foreign Minister, Carlos Washington Pastor, to Chilean Fon~ign 
Minister, Hernan Cubillos, December 12, 1978, as reported in intervie\v behveen 
Cubillos and Thomas Princen, Santiago, Chile, 1986. See THoMAs PRINCEN, IN-
TERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 141 (1992) [hereinafter PRINCEN, 
INTERMEDIARIES). 
2. While the term "Vatican" in its strict sense refers only to the official residence 
of the Pope in Rome or the Vatican City State, I use it here to refer more generally to 
the papal government including the Holy See and its office responsible fbr interna-
tional relations. See generally JORRI DUURSMA, FRAG?vlENTATI,ON AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS OF MtcRo-STATES, 374-419 (1996); Robert John Araujo, The 
International Personality and Sovereignty of the Holy See, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 291, 
291-360 (2001). 
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era! historical and journalistic works in Argentina and Chile.3 It 
has been used generally as a case .study to inform discussions of 
international law, diplomacy, and mediation.4 Thomas Princen, 
the leading American scholar of the conflict, has used the dis-
pute to probe theoretical aspe.cts of the goals and effectiveness 
of mediation.5 Others too have used the case to illustrate the 
diplomatic process and the value of long-lasting negotiation in 
the face of apparent stalemate;6 Although all studies note the 
unique nature of the Pope and Vatican as mediators in reaching 
a peaceful solution, no study has attempted to analyze the role 
of the Vatican through the lens of Roman Catholicism.7 
This article seeks to contribute in this direction. Attempt-
ing to view the Vatican's intervention, actions, and procedures in 
3. See, e.g., SANTIAGO BENADAVA, REcuERoos DE LA MEorAcION PoNTIFICIA 
ENTRE CHILE Y ARGENTINA (1978-1985) (Santiago, 1999) (Benadava was a member 
of the Chilean _negotiating- team); ALBERTO MAR!N MADRID, EL CAso DEL CANAL 
BEAGLE (Santiago, 1987) (Chilean ColonelMarfn served on a commis.sion addressing 
the Argentine -and Chilean border); ALVAREZ NATALE, BEAGLE: DE Bnu1os Y 
FANTASMAS A LA -DECISION FINAL (Buenos Aires, 1984) (using the dispute to critique 
nationalism and to argue for La_tjn American integration); BRUNO PASSARELLI, EL 
DELIRIO ARMADO.: ARGENTINA~CHILE, LA GUERRA QUE EvtTd EL PAPA (Buenos 
Aires, 1998) (Passarelli covered the event for the Argentine media); Luis ALFONSO 
TAPIA, ESTA NocHE: LA GUERRA (Vina del Mar, 1997) (Tapia covered the event for 
the Chilean media); FABIO V10 VAL01v1Eso, LA ME01Ac16N DE S.S. EL PAPA JuAN 
PABLO II (Santiago, 1984). Much of the dispute must be reconstructed from individ-
ual accounts because the pertinent papers in the Vatican are sealed for seventy-five 
years after the event. See BENADAVA, supra, at 10. 
4. See Gilbert Apollis, La Mediation Internationale du Pape Jean-Paul ll dans 
!'A/faire du. Canal de Beagle, in Jo£L-BENOtT o'ON0R10, LE SAINT-SIEGE DAN LES 
RELATIONS lNTERNATIONALEs, 323-61 (Paris, 1989); HenryT. King, Jr. & Marc A. Le 
Forestier, Papal Arbiiration: Hott' the Early Catholic Chui-ch Influenced Modern Dis-
pute Resolution, 52 SMO D1sr. REsoL: J. 74, 78 (1997); Guillermo R Moncayo, La 
Mediation Pontijicale dans l'Affaire du Canal Beagle, 242 RECUEIL DES CouRs DE 
L'ACAD~MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 197-433 (The Hague, 1993) (Moncayo 
served as chief of the Argentine negotiating team from 1979 to 1982). Moncayo's 
study contains a bibliography. Id. at 428-33. 
5. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1; Thomas Princen, International 
Mediation-The Vie1v froni the Vatican: Lessons ft·o1n Mediatlng tile Beagle channel 
Displlte, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 347-66 (1987) [hereinafter Princen, Mediation]; 
6, See Mark Laudy, The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis 
Intervention and Forun1 Building, iii WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT, 293-320 (Melanie c. Greenberg et al. eds., 
2000); Lisa Lindsley, The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation Resolves a 
Centwy-Old Displlle, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 435 (1987). 
7. One author has chronicled the response of the Argentine episcopacy and has 
abstracted over 150 public statements of the Church's hierarchy in Argentina address-
ing the dispute. See CLAUDIO Gomo, EL BEAGLE, LA IGLESIA v AMERICA LATINA 
(Buenos Aires, 1984). 
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this way provides important insights into numerous aspects of 
the dispute. Not only does this approach yield a useful analyti-
cal tool for understanding the role of the Vatican in the Beagle 
dispute, but also it signals some of the prospects of and limita-
tions to similar interventions by the Vatican in the future. 
Before addressing Vatican involvement, this article sets out the 
nature of the dispute between Argentina and Chile as essential 
background to the analysis that follows. 
I. THE DISPUTE 
A. The Importance of the Beagle Channel in the Late 1970s 
The Andes Mountains have long provided a clear geo-
graphical feature for much of the border between Argentina and 
Chile. The southernmost tip of South America, however, does 
not have a geographical and historically recognized boundary. 
Even the language of the governing document clarifying the 
border between Argentina and Chile, the Boundary Treaty of 
1881, was open to varying interpretations concerning the owner-
ship of the numerous islands at the tip of the continent. This 
treaty uses the Beagle Channel, a channel connecting the Atlan-
tic and Pacific Oceans and lying to the south of the better-
known Straits of . Magellan, as an important geographical 
marker.s The treaty gives Chile '.'all the islands to the south of 
Beagle Channel' up to Cape Horn, and those there may be to the 
west of Tierra de! Fuego."9 
For decades, Argentina and Chile expressed little interest in 
making a final determination of the boundary, ownership of is-
lands, and delimitation of navigational waters in the area. This 
lack of concern over the imprecision of the arrangement was, for 
Argentina, painted against a backdrop of a general political and 
geographical agreement between the two countries that Argen-
tina would have an exclusive presence in the Atlantic Ocean and 
8. See THOMAS PRINCBN, BEAGLE CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS 1 (Case 401, Insti-_ 
tute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C., 1995) [hereinafter PmNCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL]. 
9. Id. at 1 (quoting translation as found in Jose Miguel Barros, CHILEAN-ARGEN-
TINE RELATIONS: THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CONTROVERSY 83-84 (1978}). 
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Chile in the Pacific Ocean. This understanding on the division 
of the oceans was ·termed "bioceanismo. "10 
Seeing mutual benefits in closer trading agreements in the 
1960s, the countries realized that such peripheral matters as the 
Beagle Channel islands needed to be resolved.11 By the late 
1970s, other factors played into their desire for permanent reso-
lution. These included the area's potential oil and mineral de-
posits, fishing rights, and a heightened international attention 
towards the Antarctic region in general during this period.12 
The changing consequences of territorial ownership under inter-
national law had also greatly increased the value of these islands 
to the countries. Since the Treaty of 1881, international law rec-
ognized increasingly larger maritime claims based on ownership 
of land. In the 1880s, a three-mile maritime territorial claim was 
common. Since the 1940s, several Latin American countries 
claimed 200-mile zones as patrimonial seas. By the early 1980s, 
through the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, a territo-
rial limit of twelve miles and an exclusive economic zone of 200 
miles were recognized as rights emanating from territorial s.ov-
ereignty to land. The navigational and maritime rights resulting 
from the ownership of the islands were the central issue in the 
dispute.13 After unsuccessful attempts at direct negotiation on 
the ownership of the islands and related maritime rights, the 
countries agreed to submit the dispute to arbittation.14 
B. Arbitration and its Rejection 
From 1902 until the early 1970s, Argentina and Chile made 
numerous attempts to settle their rights in regard to the islands 
near the mouth of the Beagle Channel. Other territorial dis-
putes between the two countries had been successfully resolved 
through arbitration in the past.15 This dispute, however, was un-
successfully addressed through direct negotiation, diplomatic 
10. See BE.NADA YA, supra note 3, at 15-16; PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 55. The 
bi-oceanic: principle was restated in a Protocol from 1893 that sought to clarify the 
1881 treaty. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 436-37, 445: 
11. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 134. 
12. See David M. Hinunelreich, Note, The Beagle Channel Affair: A Failure in 
Judicial Pursuasion [sic], 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971, 971 (1979); Laudy, supra 
note 6, at 296, 298; Lindsley, supra note 6, at 436-37. 
13. See Laudy, supra note. 6, at 296; Lindsley, supra note 6, at 436. 
14. See-P_RINcEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2. 
15. See Moncayo, supra note 4, at 251-54. 
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protests and, in 1960, by a ruling of the International Court of 
Justice, which was not accepted by the countries.16 Under a 
treaty between Argentina and Chile from 1902, arbitration of 
the disputed territory and maritime rights was to be conducted 
by a panel headed by the Queen of England.17 With tensions 
increasing between Argentina a.nd the United Kingdom over the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Argentina requested that arbitration 
be conducted by a panel composed of members of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice at The Hague, and.that the panel's deci-
sions be presented to the Queen for her assent. Chile agreed, 
and the matter went to arbitration in 1971.18 
The panel, composed of judges from France, Nigeria, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom, and the United States, issued it deci-
sion in 1977.19 There were no surprises. As international legal 
experts had expected, "Argentina retained navigational rights to 
its naval base in the channel, and Chile was awarded the three 
islands"20 of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva located in the chan-
nel.21 The parties were given a nine,month period to execute 
the decision from the time of its ratification by the Queen.22 
During the five years from the submission of the dispute to 
the arbitral decision, Argentine views had changed, particularly 
as a result of a military coup led by General Jorge Rafael Videla 
that overthr.ew President Isabel Per6n.23 Most of Argentina's 
military leaders opposed the arbitration decision, and the for-
eign ministry was also divided in its support. Argentina's mili-
tary believed that ownership of these channel islands would 
permit Chile to have a claim to maritime rights in the Atlantic.24 
Indeed, the changes in international law related to maritime 
rights dramatically increased Chile's Atlantic rights since the 
1881 treaty. Casting away the nineteenth-century three mile 
limit, Chile now claimed a 200 mile exclusive economic zone.25 
16. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 437; Moncayo, supra note 4, at 286-98. 
17. See PR,iNCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2. 
18. See id. 
19. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 16-18; Lindsley, supm note 6, at 438; F.V., 
The Beagle Channel Affair, 71 AM. J. lNT'L L. 733, 735 n.4 (1977). 
20. PRINCEN, supra note 1, at-134. 
21. See PRINCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2; see also,_ Moncayo, supra 
note 4, at 300-24; F.V., The Beagle Channel Affair, 71 AM. J. !NT'L L. 733-40 (1977). 
22. See PRINCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, supra note 8, at 2. 
23. See DAVID RocK, ARGENTINA 1516-1982, at 367-70 (1987). 
24. See PRJNCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note l, at 134. 
25. See LindSley, supra note 6, at 438. 
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Instead of executing the decision after its ratification by the 
Queen, Chile and Argentina went into a phase of informal nego-
tiation.26 Chile refused to reopen the arbitration's decision and 
sought only to negotiate on the question of maritime delimita-
tion. Raising issues far beyond the ownership of three small 
channel islands, Argentina sought to re.negotiate all aspects of 
the dispute, because, in its view, the questions were relevant to 
its sovereignty. During the second half of 1977, Argentina be-
gan mobilizing troops to the south and stepped up military exer-
cises in the region. With Argentilla's rejection of Chile's 
invitation to submit the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice, Presidents Pinochet and Videla attempted a settlement 
in January of 1978. Their general agreement disintegrated as ne-
gotiating teams worked to express the. details of the agreement 
between the presidents.27 On January 25, 1978, Argentina offi-
cially rejected the arbitration decision and the Queen's award 
based on the decision.2s 
C. The Act of Puerto Montt and its Failure 
On February 20, 1978, Chile and Argentina agreed to the 
Act of Puerto Montt where they pledged to continue negotia-
tions under a three phase process.29 The first stage was success-
ful in agreeing upon the procedural aspects of the negotiation. 
The six-month second stage tackled the substantive aspects of 
the dispute. Any movement on the issue of the ownership of the 
channel islands and the maritime rights of the two countries was 
insignificant. By the end of the second stage in October, 1978, 
various proposals had failed. Argentina remained adamant in 
its desire for the channel islands, and Chile remained steadfast 
in its refusal. Argentina's military rhetoric increasingly asserted 
notions of sovereignty. Pinochet spoke of principle and interna-
tional policy."0 The channel islands had taken on a symbolic 
26. See BENADAVA, -supra note 31 at 19-20. 
27. See BENADAYA,, s1jpra, note 3, at 20-21;. PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES supra 
note 1, at 134-35; PRINCEN, BEAGLE CHANNEL, sup;_·a note 8, at 4-5. 
28. See Argentina-Chile: The Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the 
Beagle Arbitration, Jan. 25-26, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 738-50; Himmelreich, supra note 12, at 
974-90 (discussing arbitration decision and Argentina's grounds for rejecting it); Mon-
cayo, supra note 4, at 324-26. 
29. See BENADAVA, supra note 31 at 23'.°25; Moncayo, supra note 4, at 334-44; 
PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES supra note 1, at 136. 
30. see -PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIE;!S supra note 1, at 136. 
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identity much greater than their true national or strategic value. 
Chile based its position on strict readings of international law 
and the favorable decision of the arbitration panel. Argentina's 
position considered the changes in international law since the 
Treaty of 1881 and the overall political aspects of the bi-oceanic 
principle.31 
As hopes for resolution faded, the political and military re-
sponses escalated. Economic sanctions, trading hindrances, ex-
pulsion of immigrants, air raid drills, and stock piling and 
purchases of arms were all undertaken as the countries prepared 
for the date when any extant negotiation procedures expired, 
November 2, 1978.32 Negotiations fell apart and "both countries 
immediately began a total mobilization of armed forces. Troops 
converged on the borders, and the two navies began moving 
south. "3.3 
Diplomatic exchanges attempted to abate the crisis. The 
key activities were conducted by Chile's Foreign Minister, 
Hernan Cubillos, and Argentina's Foreign Minister, Carlos 
Washington Pastor. Cubillos and his staff considered appeals to 
the Organization of American States, the Uniteq Nations, and 
the International Court of Justice. Chilean desires to submit the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice were met with Ar-
gentine informal responses that such . a request to the court 
would be tantamount to a declaration of war.34 
Mediation by a neutral third party appeared to be the only 
way to prevent an eventual niilitary battle. Fropi the Chilean 
perspective, the third party had to have cert[lin attributes. 
Later, Cubillos was to tell Thomas Princen, "[a]nd when we talk 
of power, I'm talking about influence, moral power, political 
power, economic power."35 Argentina too was rnoving towards 
mediation, and Argentine candidates to undertake the task in-
cluded "the King of Spain, the United Nations, the Queen of 
England, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Henry Kis-
singer, and the Pope."36 
31. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 438. 
32. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES supra note 1, at 137. 
33. See id. at 138. 
34. See id. at 138. 
35. See id. at 139. 
36. See id. at 139. 
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II. THE VATICAN INTERVENTION 
A. Preliminmy Vatican Involvement 
[Vol. 28:1 
Since mid-1978, Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos visited 
Pope John Paul I and sought Vatican help in the crisis. The Pope 
had sent a letter to local bishops in South America to urge peace 
in the region.37 Chilean Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez had also 
informed John Paul I of the worsening situation in September, 
1978.38 After the death of John Paul I, as the crisis heightened, 
Cubillos sought an audience with Pope John Paul II. Although 
he was in office only five days at the time of their meeting, John 
Paul II had been briefed and studied the situation.39 Thus, as 
aggression mounted in the region, the Vatican was somewhat 
aware of the seriousness of the situation. 
The selection of the Pope as the mediator came about 
through an unexpected sequence of events. As of December, 
1978, the Vatican made it clear that the idea of papal mediation 
was "premature" and that the Pope would undertake an active 
role only after a request from both governments.40 On Decem-
ber 11, 1978, Cubillos arrived in Buenos Aires seeking diplo-
matic solutions. Thomas Princen's account of the events and of 
his interview with Cubillos follow: 
Cubillos arrived i.n Buenos Aires the night of December 11, 1978. He 
attended a dinner hosted by Videla, Pastor, and several other high-
level officials. Among the guests was Papal Nuncio Pio Laghi. Tak-
ing Cubillos aside, Pio Laghi explained that he had had long talks 
with Videla. He trusted Videla and was sure an agreement could be 
reached. The official meeting began the next morning. Cubillos re-
called the events of that day. 
December 12th is a day I will never forget. 'I11ings were really hot. 
The ambiante [sic] in Buenos Aires was one of war. I \Vas received 
with proper protocol that corresponds to a foreign minister. Troops 
and all sorts of things, everything done very carefully .... 
I started the morning by paying an official visit to President 
Videla ... I was so concerned about the power structure of Argen-
tina I did something completely on the spur of the moment which I 
had not planned on doing, but remembering my conversation with 
Laghi the previous 11ight [and] having seen so·many signs that 
Videla didn't have any power .... I said something that really 
created a shock .... I said, Mr. President ... I want to be sure that 
37. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 138. 
38. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 26. 
39. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 138. 
40. See id. at 140. 
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your n1inister has the power to reach a decision, I want-to be sure 
he has the same power I have, which I suppose comes from you 
Videla said ... Mr. Minister if you were not such a nice person, and 
we didn't know each other before, and I really would ask you to 
leave, because that is a very unproper question. And after having 
said that, he. went on for an hour explaining to me the power struc-
ture in Argentina . . . So [he said], go at ease, make the decision, 
reach an agreement with my foreign mini.ster and you can sign the 
accord this evening .... 
So, we went to the Palacio San Martin . . . . We entered into a 
meeting alone .. , with Pastor. And we sat down and he opened 
tl1e conversation saying, ["]Mr. Minister ... so that we don't lose 
any time, I want to make it clear to you that we have accepted your 
suggestion of mediation, but for the Argentine Republic, the only 
mediator possible is his Holiness the Pope.["] I looked at him 
straight in the face and said, "Agreed. What else?" And· he could 
not continue the conversation. · 
Now, looking back (because we have analyzed this many times), 
the Argentines played that card sure that we would not accept the 
Vatican as mediator. But I think that they made a great mistake 
there. Why did they think that we would not accept the Vatican? 
Because relations between the government in Chile and the local 
church. were lousy. But what they didn't understand ..• we had.the 
[local] church on this matter on our side. And obviously,we would 
accept the Vatican if it is number one on niy list. But it was incredi-
ble, I will never forget that minute, he was so taken back that he 
couldn't continue the conversation ... , · 
I think he wanted to end there and say that it bad failed because 
they did not accept the Vatican. In five·minutes I was o.ut of there, 
and we agreed to ask our delegations to get together and write an 
agreement, and we agreed to sign it at 4:00 p.m. Then he came 
back and said ... I will check with Videla .. , . So T stayed there 
with my delegation and about an hour later he came beaming, smil-
ing, and said, I have full green light, again. And so, go and write [it 
up], and let's meet here at four to sign the agreement .... 
Five minutes before I left, around 3:30 p.m., I received a personal 
call from Pastor who was practically in tears saying, I have been 
desautol'izado [ disauthorized]. There will be no signing of an 
agreement, I am not authorized to sign anything. President Videla 
has been desautorizado by the Junta and no agreement can be 
made. It was like speaking to someone who had been knocked out; 
he had no reasons to give, he had no excuses. TI1ey had proposed 
the Pope, I had agreed. We had had no bargaining, and he couldn't 
sign .... 
9 
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Well, there I called Pio Laghi, the nuncio, and told him the full 
story. I think that it was the first time ... Pio Laghi had learned 
that we had agreed on the Pope .... He couldn't .believe it.41 
Each country called on other powers, including the Vatican, 
to act to reduce the chances of the impending war. President 
Carter and the United States Ambassador to Chile, George 
Landau, tried to apply U.S. pressure to bring about a peaceful 
resolution, but relations with neither Pinochet nor the Argen-
tine Junta were strong enough to exert meaningful influence.42 
Chile sought the intervention of the Organization of American 
States.43 The countries moved towards war and regional alli-
ances were being constructed so that there was a possibility hos-
tilities would not be limited to Argentina 11nd Chile. Peru and 
Bolivia had both lost territory to Chile in the late nineteenth 
century, and with Argentina as an ally, they might act to regain 
these areas.44 
On December 14, 1978, President Videla gave the orders 
for an invasion of the islands on December 21 or 22. He told 
Pio Laghi that there was no choice in the matter; if he had not 
given the orders, he would have been summarily removed by the 
Junta and replaced by a more extreme leader. Laghi suggested 
direct intervention by the Pope, and Videla said such an act 
might avert the war.45 
As warships steamed towards each other in the Straits of 
Magellan on December 23, Pope John Paul II announced that he 
was sending a personal representative.46 With this news, mili-
tary activity froze. A few Argentine troops who had secretly 
slipped into Chilean territory had to be recalled from their ad-
vanced positions.47 The.papal representative, Cardinal Antonio 
Samore, caught the next flight from Rome to Buenos Aires. It 
41. PR1NcEN, INTERMEDJARIEs, supra note 1, at 140-42; see TAPIA, supra 110.te 3, 
at 139-47. This version of events contrasts starkly with at least one other that places 
the cause of the impasse on Chilean obstinacy to limit the scope of the mediation. See 
PASSARELLI, supra note. 3, at 75-80. 
42. U.S. surveillance and intelligence \Vas channeled to the Vatican throughout 
the crisis and was a key source of information for the Pope. Id. See PruNcEN, IN-
TERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 143. 
43. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 41. 
44. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 142-43. 
45. See id; at 143. 
46. See id. at 145. 
47. See.PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 131. 
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was Christmas Day. On arrival the following day, he was wel-
comed by thousands demonstrating their support for peace.48 
Despite being already in his early seventies, Samore was 
the ideal person to represent the Pope's intervention. He had a 
long-standing interest in Latin America and spoke Spanish flu-
ently. He had accompanied Paul VI on his trip to Medellin, Co-
lombia, and had been a papal nuncio in Bogota. He had been 
involved with regional conferences of the Latin American epis-
copate, and even his religious devotion was closely tied to Latin 
America. Much of his devotional worship was directed towards 
the Virgin of Guadalupe.49 Dating from early Spanish colonial 
times, the tradition and image of this Virgin are perhaps the 
most famous in Mexico and Latin America. She wa~ chosen pa-
troness of many countries of Latin America, and in 1910, Pius X 
declared her the Pattoness of Latin America. In 1945, Pius XII 
stated that she was "Queen of Mexico and Empress of 
America.''>O It is not surprising that Samore would turn to this 
image of the Virgin considering its close association with Latin 
America. 
B. The Mechanics: Cardinal Sainore's Offer of Bans Offices 
The parties were far from mediation of the dispute by 
Samore. Instead, Samore sought to offer the Church's hons of-
fices or "good offices" to serve as a means of communication 
and information for the parties.51 Samore single-mindedly and 
forcefully pressured each side to express and to concretize their 
positions in a series of testing sessions of shuttle diplomacy be-
tween Buenos Aires and Santiago. Chile was steadfast in its de-
sire to uphold the arbitral decision, and Argentina's position 
was refined to include four main elements. Argentina required 
that continuation of negotiations Would have to take place 
under the third phase of the Act of Puerto Montt. Second, the 
arbitral decision would have to be declared null. Third, the bal-
ance of Argentina's control of the Atlantic and Chile's control 
48. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 144. 
49. See -PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 136-37. For additional biographical infor-
mation of Sa.more, see TAPIA, supra note 3, at 171:.74. 
50. A.M. Garibay! K., si.1b 110111. Guadalupe, Our Lady of, in 6 NEW CATHOLIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 821-22 (1967). 
51. See, e.g., Ruldolf L. Bindschedler, Good Offices, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pua. 
uc INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-69 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Amsterdam, 1981); Moncayo, 
supra note 4, at 214-18. 
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of the Pacific would have to be maintained. Fourth, limitations 
on the nature of the mediation would have to be determined 
beforehand.52 
After several trips back and forth between Santiago and 
Buenos Aires, Samore was making progress. The prospects of 
mediation by the Vatican and an agreement among the three 
parties were being floated by Samore. Many drafts later, Pi-
nochet and the Argentine Junta agreed to sign an agreement for 
mediation in Montevideo. The deal had been settle.cl and was 
set for signing. Despite the efforts of an Argentine army com-
mander to stop Pastor from going to the meeting scheduled for 
January 8, Pastor arrived safely in Montevideo with authority to 
enter into the agreement. 53 
III. THE Acr OF MONTEVIDEO 
Samore knew that a further step needed to be taken, but if 
he had mentioned it before the parties were committed to sign-
ing the agreement, the process would have crumbled. Samore 
correctly realized that the usefulness of mediation could be im-
mediately destroyed by one small mistake by either of the ·par-
ties who were nervously poised towards military action. 
Although the meeting at Montevideo was officially only for 
signing the mediation agreement, Samore demanded that the 
parties agree to withdraw forces to a status quo ante level. This 
was a second, non-negotiated, part of the Act of Montevideo. 
Chile accepted, but Pastor had to consult Videla who, appar-
ently without consulting the Junta, told Pastor to agree. When 
Pastor returned before the Junta, he put his position on the line 
to uphold the agreement. The Junta agreed. In early January, 
1979, Samore returned to the Vatican with an outline for contin-
uing negotiations that narrowly sidestepped imminent war.54 
The Pope accepted the countries' request for mediation and 
again appointed Samore as his personal representative, this time 
for mediation at the. Vatican. The talented Vatican personnel 
were at Samore's disposal. Samore was assisted by two priests 
at the Vatican, Monsignor Faustino Sainz Munoz and the Jesuit 
Fiarello Cavalli.55 Sainz Munoz was the son of a Spanish Su-
52. See PRI_NCEN, INTERMEDIARIEs,_supra note-1,:at_ 144_-45. 
53. See id. at 147-48. 
54. See id. at 148-50. 
55. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 310; Tapia, supra note 3, at 175. 
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preme Court judge and had studied law in Madrid.56 From 1981, 
Samore was also assisted in the mediation by the Colombian 
Archbishop Gabriel Montalvo.57 Montalvo was the son of a Co-
lombian ambassador to the Vatican and had served as Pronuncio 
in Tunis, Algeria, and Libya. He was educated in Rome and had 
served as a Vatican diplomat throughout Latin America.58 
The Pope himself officially opened the mediation and met 
with the delegations from Argentina and Chile. The delegation 
from Argentina was headed by Guillermo R. Moncayo. En-
rique Bernstein led the Chilean team.59 The Pope wanted the 
mediator to seek direction from God and offer advice to the 
parties.60 At key points in the mediation, the Pope would per-
sonally request that the parties remember the importance of 
their work and the need for progress. 61 
Despite such encouragement, progress was slow, and by 
May, 1980, the parties had only just begun to touch on the most 
sensitive aspects of the dispute: territory and maritime demarca-
tion. Literally hundreds of meetings were conducted by Samore 
both individually and jointly with the delegations. The positions 
of the two countries were exactingly set out in writing. With a 
stalemate languishing over the mediation, Samore sought per-
sonal papal involvement. John Paul II met with the delegations 
and informed them that they were far from an agreement. He 
would offer his own proposed solution.62 By mid-December, 
1980, both delegations were presented not only with the papal 
proposal, but also with a reminder that the Pope's actions were 
necessitated because "God, the Father of all, drove [him] to 
make a gesture of peace .... "63 Part of the Pope's proposed 
56. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 108. 
57. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 231. 
58. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 104. 
59. Ian Bro,vriJie and Prosper We:il served as advisors to Chile. See BENADAVA, 
supra note 3, at 63. 
60. See, PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 150M51. 
61. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 170. 
62. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 152-'54. Benadava speculates 
that the proposal was authored by San1ore- and Sainz Muftoz. See BENADAVA, supra 
note 3, at 82. The Pope's message on delivering the proposal noted that it did not 
seek a purely legal solution, but one "ex bono et aequo" ste1nming from the theory of 
the "ancient"Roman jurists and canonists11 \Vithout setting aside the "support and light 
Of divine wisdom." BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 86. 
63. PruNcEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note l; at 154. 
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solution was a jointly governed region covering the contested 
area where both countries would have certain rights. 64 
Chile accepted the proposal early in 1981, but Argentina 
waited and then unofficially objected to it in March, 1981. Ten-
sions mounted along the border between the two countries. 
Again, a direct appeal from the Pope led to both governments 
decreasing the possibility of violence in the region. Over the 
next few months the situation in and between both countries 
deteriorated.65 Argentina stated that it would not renew a 
treaty from 1972 that provided disputes between Argentina and 
Chile be submitted to the International Coutt of Justice at The 
Hague. Again, only through a direct formal proposal of the 
Pope did both sides agree to extend this treaty which provided 
for an important, non-military default procedure in the event of 
unsuccessful mediation.66 In April, 1982, Argentina entered into 
war with the United Kingdom over the Falkland/Malvinas Is-
lands, which some saw as a prelude to a Beagle Channel inva-
sion. 67 Things in Chile were equally difficult as Pinochet 
substituted his civilian ministers with military men.68 Chile was 
also entering a period of national economic crisis. 69 After losing 
the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Argentine military government 
had little power to negotiate, and it was not until new Argentine 
representatives, this time "professional diplomats," appointed 
by President Alfonsin, arrived that negotiations could be 
renewed.10 
Having spent nearly six years of his life deftly delaying war 
between Argentina and Chile, Sam ore died on February 3, 1983. 
His last words were addressed to Montalvo and Sainz Mufioz 
and concerned reaching a peaceful resolution between Argen-
tina and Chile. n 
To replace Samore, the Pope requested Vatican Secretary of 
State Cardinal Agustino Casaroli to step in as the new head of 
the mediation team. With a change in the Argentine govern-
ment, and with informal negotiations between Argentine and 
64. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 446. 
65. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 154-57. 
66. See BENADAVA, supra note ~. at 117-18. 
67. See TAPIA, supra _nOte -3, at' 218. 
68. See PRINCEN; INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 154~57. 
69. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 447. 
70. See id. at 447. 
71. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 238. 
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Chilean representatives stationed in Europe, slow progress to-
wards peace could once again be seen. On January 23, 1984, the 
foreign ministers of Argentina and Chile signed a Declaration of 
Peace and Friendship. Within six months, Casaroli had 
brokered an accord. By meeting with and pressing each party to 
abandon its bargaining strategy and to make honest "confes-
sions" for the benefit of the mediation team, Casaroli was in a 
position to request proposals for a solution from both sides. 
From these proposals, Casaroli prepared his own sugges-
tions for the divisions of territory and the settlement of eco-
nomic compensation, the latter to be addressed through a 
bilateral commission. Casaroli's suggestions were put in front of 
the Argentine and Chilean delegations on an accept-or-reject 
basis, and he made it clear that a rejection by either party would 
terminate papal mediation. Both accepted Casaroli's sugges-
tions and a drafting team was brought in to prepare a treaty text. 
After Argentina obtained permission to sigp. through a national 
referendum on the issue, the foreign ministers of Argentina and 
Chile and Casaroli signed the treaty on November 29, 1984. 
Chile obtained the three disputed islands, but limited its mari-
time claims to a line about thirty miles to the southeast of the 
islands, rather than the accepted 200 mile economic zone often 
asserted. Argentina maintained the split between the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans for which it was willing to wage war.72 Peace 
between the countries over this issue had been obtained. The 
treaty also provided for commissions to settle disputes between 
the countries and to improve economic relations.73 
IV. FAITH-BASED INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF VATICAN INTERVENTION IN 
THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE 
A. The Religious Authority of the Church 
Prior commentators on the Beagle Channel dispute have 
readily noted the "moral" force of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Latin American relations. Perhaps believing that "moral" is 
an acceptable and neutral code-word for "religious," few studies 
have distinctly discussed the Church as a "religious" force in set-
72. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 131-57; PRlNCEN, INTERMEDJAJlIEs, supra 
note 1, at 158-61. 
73. See Lindsley, rnpra note 6, at 449. 
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tling this international dispute. Indeed, modern scholars and 
practitioners of international law become uncomfortable when 
the terms "religion" and "international law" are mentioned in 
proximity outside of some limited contexts, such as human 
rights or the history of international law.74 As a present relig-
ious force, though, the Church is not limited to assessments of 
what is right or wrong under the circumstances. For Roman 
Catholics, the Church can authoritatively judge what is Good or 
Evil, and what actions or omissions may lead to eternal damna-
tion. This is something different from and additional to moral 
authority; it is religious authority. As Yvonne Thayer, a former 
official at the U.S. Embassy in Argentina from 1976 to 1979, 
notes, "In the Latin world, the Church has a stature. that other 
[mortals] don't have."15 The Church's·unique authority, its re-
ligious authority, helps explain why on De.cember 23, 1978, 
Chile and Argentina chose to listen to John Paul II's appeal for 
peace.76 It appears that only the Pope could command their ac-
tions without a loss of military honor owtheir parts.77 This was 
true despite the individually strained relations between the dic-
tatorships and the Church both at home and in Rome.78 
Peacemaking is a religious vocation. As earthly representa-
tives of Jesus Christ, members of the Church are called to work 
for peace.79 Samore himself saw his presence in the region as 
74. See HAROLD J. BER~IAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LA\V 
AND RELlOION 277-87 (1993); William P. George, Grotiu~ • .Theology, and Intema-
tional Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 605, 606 (1999-2000); Mark W. Janis, Religion and 
The Literature of International La1v: SOnre Standard Texts, in RELIGION AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 121-43 (Mark W. Janis.& Carolyn Evans eds., TI1e Hague, 1999); David 
Kennedy, /n1ages of Religion in International Legal-Theory, in RELIGlON AND INTER· 
NATIONAL LA,V, supral' at 145-53. Cf. FAITH~BASED DIPLOMACY: TRUMPING REAL-
POLITIK (Douglas Johnston ed., 2003); RELIGION, THE MISSING DIMENSION OF 
STATECRAIT (Douglas Jolmston & Cynthia Sampson eds., 1994) (essays illustrating 
the importance of religion in international peacemaking). 
75. See Lindsley,.supra note 6, at 443 (citing Yvonne Thayer, Director of Face-to-
Face, Carnegie Endowment, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Argentina, 1976-1979 
(Nov. 26 1985)). 
76. See id. at 444. 
77. See id. at 453. 
78. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 317. 
79. "All citizens and all govetnrrients are obliged ·to \York for the avoidance of 
war ... CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CI<U!'CH § 2308 (1994). See generally id. at §§ 
2302-17. For the historical background of the Church's activities in \Vorking to,vards 
peace between belligerent Countries and its involvement in peace treaties, see W1L-
HELM G. GRE\VE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-59, 106-13, 141-62 
(Michael Byers trans., Berlin, 2000); Apollis, supra note 4, at 326-35; King & Le 
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something beyond a typical offer of assistance by a neutral third 
party. He spoke of "mission and not of mediation," of the new-
ness of such intervention, and .of God as the prince of peace and 
the Holy Virgin as the queen of peace.Bo Indeed, his aim was 
"not to continue the negotiation in a strict juridical plan [sic] nor 
in a political plan in the sense that it means to dispense with the 
law, but rather in a new plan, in a higher plan-if you permit a 
priest to express it like this-spiritual. "B1 Likewise, John Paul II 
described his involvement in the dispute in 1979 as stemming 
from his identity as "one who considers that peace is one of the 
greatest human values and its pursuit and realization a desire, 
nay more, a mandate of the Son of God made Man, the Prince 
of Peace, whose vicar Providence has made me among men."82 
The Pope, as a religious authority; was called upon to bring 
peace between Argentina and Chile as the dispute grew out of 
control. As early as September, 1978, Cubillos met with Pope 
John Paul I in whose short time as Pope sent a letter imploring 
the Episcopal conferences of Argentina and Chile to work for 
peace.B3 The letter noted the many common attributes of the 
countries, including their identical religious ties. B4 Certainly, a 
direct personal request from the Pope to a faithful Catholic 
would be a very difficult request to refuse.B5 As the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Argentine Air Force said at the time, 
Forestier, supra note 4, at 75-77; Moncayo, s1q1ra note 4, at 256-71; Alain Wijffels, 
Martinus Garatus Laudensis on Treaties, in PEACE TREA'l'IEs AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AoEs TO WORLD WAR ONE 
192-193 (Randall Lesaffer ed., Cambridge, 2004). It appears the invocation at the 
beginning of the 1984 treaty-"In the name of Almighty God"-the same invocation 
of the Treaty of 1881, had more rhetorical value than religious significance. See 
SERGIO GUTIERREZ 0LIVQS1 COMENTARIO SOBRE· EL TRATAD-0 DE PAZ Y AMISTAD 
coN ARGENTINA 20 (Santiago, 1986). 
80. PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 147 (citing and translating from 
ARMANDO AMUNCHASTEQUI ASTRADA, ARGENTINA-CJiJLE 184 (1980)). 
81. PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note l, at 147 (citing and translating from 
ARMANDO AMuNcttASTEQUI AsTRADA, ARGENTINA-CHILE 184 (1980)). 
82. Princen, Mediqtioi'l; -Supra note 5, at 349. For a discus_sion of the "mediative 
filnctions'' of-religion fujnternational law, see James A.R. Nafziger, The Functions of 
Religion in the In_ternatiqnal Legal Systen1, in RELcG10N AND INTERNATIONAL LA\V, 
supra note 74, at 170-71. 
83. See TAPIA, supra note 3, at 110-12. 
84. See BENADA.VA, supra note 3, at 27. 
85. "For the Ronian Pontiff, by reason of his office as Vicar of Christ, and as 
pastor of the entire Church has full, supreme, and universal power over the \Vhole 
Church, a power \Vhich he can ahvays exercise unhindered." CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 79, at § 882 (quoting Llanen gentiurn 22). 
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"Como es posible decide que no al Papa?" (How is it possible 
to say no to the Pope?).86 So important was the Pope as head of 
the mediation that his scheduled visit to England during the Fal-
klands/Malvinas War to improve Roman Catholic relations with 
the Church of England had to be balanced with a quickly 
planned visit to Argentina immediately afterwards. Nonethe-
less, in the thirty-six hours he spent in ·Argentina, he publicly 
implored his audience for peace no'less than twenty-five times.87 
The Church's religious authority might undermine its claims 
of neutrality, an attribute essential for effective and valid media-
tion. Nonetheless, on the political level, the Church offered 
neutrality. Because it lacks traditional military or political am-
bitions, it maintains a. high level of "disinterestedness and objec-
tivity" in disputes between other cow1tries. 88 Since 1929, the 
Vatican has agreed to refrain from taking sides in international 
disputes and to interpose itself only when requested by states.89 
In this sense, the Church was about as politically neutral a medi-
ator one could find. On the religious level, the Church was far 
from neutral. Because the Church asserts. a spiritual jurisdiction 
over Roman Catholics throughout the world, it and its members 
had a spiritual jurisdiction over the actors in this dispute.90 Part 
of the Church's mission is to maintain and promote peace.91 
Any hindrance of this mission, might cast those responsible into 
spiritual danger. It is unlikely that such spiritual sanctions had 
to be expressed specifically or individually to be felt by the ne-
gotiating teams and their governments. To faithful Catholics 
dealing one-on-one with the highest levels of the Church, the 
86. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 174. Analyzing the role of the Pope in the 
\Vork of Martinus Garatus, Wijffels provides and ex<.imple of this tradition: "Whereas 
the emperor's role in De confoederatione is almost reduced to its vanishing point, the 
pope as the supreme authority of the community of actors is strongly asserted. His 
superiority in Jure over the princes is unequivocally established, though the role 
ascribed to him often seems to take into account that his superiority is rather a matter 
of law, moral authority and religious duty than political (or military) clout." Wijffels, 
supra note 79, at 191. 
87. See PAsSARELLl, supra· note 3, at 227-28. 
88. See {"rincen, Mediation, _sJlpl'a note 5,. at 349. 
89, See N1cHO~AS J. HERCULES, HoLv SEE_ DIPLOMACY: A STUDY OF NON-
ALIGNMENT IN THE PosT WORLD WAR T\VO ERA 5 (M.Sc. dissertation, University of 
Bristol, 1998), available at http://w\V\V.petersnet.net/i:e_search.retrieve.cfrn?RecNun1= 
798 (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). 
90. See Princen, Mediiltion, supl'a note 5, at 348-49. CATECHISM OF THE CATHO-
uc CHURCH, supra note 79, at §§ 836-38. 
91. See supra no_te 79 and accompanying text. 
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implicit spiritual pressures must have been: sufficient to provide 
a uniquely coercive effect on those negotiating the dispute. 
Thus, in this dispute, the Vatican had dual jurisdictions. The 
first, a consensual jurisdiction, gave it authority under interna-
tional law to mediate the dispute. The second, an assumed silent 
jurisdiction, gave it the ability to exert itself directly on the ac-
tions of any Catholic involved in the dispute,92 
The religious authority of the Vatican in the dispute was not 
expressed .exclusively on the level of the Pope and bishops. The 
Vatican provided a mediation team composed entirely of clergy, 
"individuals who were trained to listen, to be understanding, to 
be patient, to try to reconcile differences. "93 They could be 
trusted with confidences, but could also use their position to co-
erce information. For example, at a later stage of the negotia-
tions, the Vatican requested that each team state its position "as 
if in confession."9• Taken seriously, this would require the 
team's "diligent self-examination" and the revelation of its 
"most secret" information.95 Only with priests could such a re-
quest be imagined in the course of negotiating an international 
dispute. 
Priests are also trained to pray, and the priests involved in 
resolving this dispute sought God's help in securing peace.96 Va-
rious accounts of the dispute record the papal nuncio, Laghi, 
turning to prayer in the last days of December, 1978, waiting for 
Vatican intervention.97 The very evening John Paul II sent word 
to the presidents of Argentina and Chile that he was willing to 
intervene based upon their request, he directed his prayer to-
wards the Holy Spirit.9s Even as Cubillos and Pastor signed the 
agreement, Samore was said to have prayed under his breath 
92. Although this second jurisdiction forcefully guided Catholics involved in the 
dispute, there were·, of course, non-Catholics who made importaht contributions to 
the mediation. See BeNADAVA, supra note 31 at 67-68. 
93. Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 349. 
94. PruNcEN, INTERfy!EriIARIES, supra n_ote 1, at 180. 
95. See CATEci11sM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 79, at § 1456. 
96. The author here-follo\vs William W. Park's suggestion that part of writing on 
la\v and religion is _to "sho\v ·an appre·ciation of \Vhat religion means in the life of 
individual believers" arrd 'to "tak[e] seriously the religious experience itself," William 
W. Park, Spiritual Energy and Secular Po~ver, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LA\V, 
supra note 74, at 270. 
97. See PASSARELLI, sup1;a note 3, at 106. 
98. See id. at 127. 
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giving thanks for the. intervention of the Holy Spirit.99 Samore 
and Latin America's affinity for the. Virgin of Gaudalupe made 
her a frequent intercessor during the peace process. The media-
tion at the Vatican opened with mass and the veneration of the 
Virgin of Guadalupe.100 Numerous times during the dispute, 
Samore sought .the .guidance of the Virgin of Guadalupe.101 
Through its bishops in the two countries, the Church continually 
called on the faithful to pray for a peaceful outcome to the 
mediation.102 
Movement towards peace was also found in religious festi-
vals, arranged pilgrimages, and in the liturgy .103 Masses were 
celebrated at various points during the mediation.104 Samore 
celebrated mass in Lujan, near Buenos Aires, shortly after arriv-
ing in Argentina and offered prayers of thanks before the Virgin 
on obtaining the agreement for the Pope to mediate the dis-
pute.105 Providing geographical balance, Samore likewise cele-
brated mass in Maipu, Chile, during his shuttle diplomacy 
between the countries.106 An important breakthrough in the 
mediation camethe day after Samor6's death, when John Paul II 
said mass for his soul. In addition to the numerous cardinals 
and Church officials present, the delegations from Argentina 
and Chile also attended. 
And when the moment for the embrace of peace came, Colonel 
Videla and Ambassador Llupis (of Chile] shook hands. Behind them, 
the other diplomats of Chile and Argentina extended their right 
hands. At that moment, this gesture acquired an immense testimo- · 
nial value. It was as if these old and stubborn .archenemies were tac-
itly laying down their arms to the fallen cardinaJ.107 
It was this type of conversion that the Church sought to 
obtain between the countries. It seems implausible that a dis-
cussion of Argentina and Chile in the late 1970s has not yet 
touched on their internal conditions or their horrid record for 
99. See id. at 157. 
100. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 61. 
lOl. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 208, 233. 
102. See Gomo, supra note 7, at 58-64; Mqncayo, supra note 4, at 381. 
103. See Garno, supra note. 7, at 72-74. 
104. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 73". The Pope also presided over private 
masses for the delegations at various points of the mediation. See Apollis, supra note 
4, at 355 n.67. 
105. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 153-54. 
106. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 54. 
107. PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 240 (author's translation). 
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human rights in the international community. At the time, Pres-
ident Carter had suspended arms sales to both countries because 
of their poor human rights records.108 Argentina was under the 
control of a repressive and violent military junta. Since the mid-
1970s and after the death of Peron in 1974, the military wiped 
out guerilla troops, sympathizers, .suspects, and innocents 
through random "disappearances," murdering over 10,000 indi-
viduals. "The last phase of the guerilla war was its bloodiest and 
most terrifying: all due process of law was overturned; military 
patrols infested the country; thousands vanished into the prisons 
and police torture chambers. "109 Various factions of the military 
vied for power, and by the early 1980s, they had steered Argen-
tina into the calamitous Falklands/Malvinas War, which pro-
duced almost two thousand casualties.110 The war led to the 
Junta's fall from power. Videla and the military leaders of his 
era were sentenced to prison in 1985.111 
Pinochet's Chile was not any better. In 1973, his coup had 
similarly targeted the democratically elected government of Al-
lende, and set out relentlessly to imprison, to torture, and to 
banish any opposition. Although most of the blood had been let 
by 1977, "disappearances, torture, and murder were, however, 
to recur at regular intervals until almost the end of the military 
regime. "112 Pinochet has faced prosecution for the crimes of 
murder and torture.113 
In sum, Argentina and Chile could be characterized as na-
tionalistic military dictatorships, with miserable human rights 
records, swiftly positioning themselves for war against each 
other. If war broke out, Argentine aspirations included not only 
the taking of the islands in question, but also an all-out occupa-
tion of Chile. The Junta had plans in hand for assaults on Santi-
108. See Laudy, supm note 6, at 307. 
109. See Roe!(, supra note 23, at 367-68; see also MARGUERITE FE!TLOWITZ, A 
LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE LEGACIES OF TORTURE (1998); _NUN_CA 
MA.s: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE CoMM1ss10N ON-THE DISAPPEARED (1986). 
110. See RocK, sl1pra note 23, at 374-83. 
111. Marla Ines Bergoglio, Argentina: The Effects of De111ocratic Institutibnaliza-
tion, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND 
LATIN EuRoPE 21 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo eds., 2003). 
112. SIMON COLLIER & WJLLIAfvt F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE, 1808-1994, 
361 (Cambridge, 1996); see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL Cor-,..tMISSION ON TRUTH AND 
REcoNCILlATION (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993). 
113. See lluth Wedge,vood1 Internat_ional Crli-ninal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 
40 VA. J. lNT'L L. 829-47 (2000). 
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ago and Valparafso.11• The Church, however, is accustomed to 
dealing with the sinful and violent. Historically, theologically, 
and institutionally, it is an expert in the area. · The Church seeks 
to reconcile sinners, to turn them from evil to good, from war to 
peace. In this dispute, the Church was able to apply its centuries 
of experience in religious conversion to the similar problem of 
political conversion. It invoked the power of God, prayer, and 
liturgy. From this. central hub of faith, the Church also em-
ployed more traditional tools of international law and diplomacy 
to resolve the dispute, but always with its own interpretation of 
these methods. 
B. Information Control and Secrecy 
The Vatican is an institution used to maintaining secrecy 
and has a "low need for public disclosure and public accounta-
bility."115 As part of its function .as mediator in the Beagle 
Channel dispute, the Vatican kept tight control over information 
released to the public. All public statements regarding the me-
diation were issued jointly by the parties and the Vatican media-
tion team. Thus, the parties were, for the most part, unable to 
try their case in the media or influence popular beliefs at 
home.116 The Vatican was the main and only official source con-
cerning the progress of the mediation. Leaks from within the 
Vatican were highly unlikely. As Princen stated, "[a ]s a small, 
tradition-bound institution, the Holy See is, therefore, accus-
tomed to keephig things under wraps."117 This control aided 
greatly in resolving the dispute by removing all of the position-
ing and feigning the parties might otherwise have been com-
pelled to undertake in presenting their views to the public. It 
also reduced the number of relevant statements and positions of 
the parties to those presented in the official course of the 
mediation. 
The Vatican's control of information did not end with limit-
ing what would be presented to the public and the press; it also 
114. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 17-42. 
115. Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 352. 
116. See id. at 348. "For the most part, the two countries followed this guide)ine 
throughout this dispute. The most notable exception was the Pope's highly confiden-
tial 1980 proposal, parts of which were leaked to the Argentine press within one 
-month." Laudy, supra note 6, ai-310-11; see also PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 185. 
117. See PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 174. 
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had its own means of informing the people and governments of 
Argentina and Chile. With the presence of approximately 115 
bishops throughout Argentina and Chile, the Vatican had a re-
sponsive and loyal system of disseminating informaticin.11s Its 
influence, however, was not only limited to the Church hierar-
chy within each country, but also. could operate on a number of 
levels simultaneously. Every Catholic Church in Argentina and 
Chile was a potential outlet for information the Vatican wanted 
to telegraph directly to the people of each country. The Church, 
thus, had a strong popular constituency within the disputing 
countries and was able to demand popular support for peace on 
a grass-roots level.119 While ruling individuals in Latin Ameri-
can countries found it easy to disregard popular demonstrations 
and unrest, such activities bolstered and instigated by the 
Church were more difficult to ignore. For example, late in 1978 
as the countries headed for war, "[tJhe Roman Catholic Church 
in Chile and Argentina orchestrated a campaign for peace which 
included marches to the Andes; youth movements, and peti-
tions. "120 The Vatican's means of disseminating information 
proved to be especially useful when it substantially limited me-
dia access to the mediation. In this way, the long-arm aspect of 
the Vatican made it effective in influencing the positions of each 
party. The Vatican's reach also made it Urtusually able to exert 
influence across the leadership and decision-making structure 
within each country. As a result, the Vatican could put pressure 
on foreign ministers, presidents, and military leaders who might 
dissent to the decisions made by their respective representatives 
at the negotiations.121 
This proved to be particularly important in Argentina, 
which, in the course of the negotiations, "had five presidents 
and five delegation chiefs."122 For example, in the final days of 
December, 1978, Laghi, the nuncio in Argentina, was able to 
speak directly to President Videla .. Seekirtg Videla's Consent to 
papal intervention, Laghi remirtded the President that the 
Church opposed war and that the President, whose piety was 
118. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 452. In October, 1978, Bishop Valdes Suber-
caseaux sent a letter to the presidents of Argentina and Chile imploriilg peace· and 
love between. the countrie_s. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 28-29. 
119. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 317. 
120. Lindsley, supra note 6, at 441. 
121. See Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 354-55. 
122. Id. at 363; see also Laudy, supra note 6, at 312. 
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publicly known, should seek peace through papal interven-
tion.123 Similarly, the local episcopate in Argentina served to 
communicate the gravity of the situation to Rome at the close of 
1978.124 In Chile, such direct influence by the localchurch hier-
archy was more limited due to the cool relationship between the 
Chilean President of the Episcopal Conference and Pinochet.125 
Nonetheless, late in 1983, after the terms of the treaty had been 
worked out, cardinals from Argentina and Chile sent word of 
their support for the treaty to the episcopacies of their home 
countries.126 In this and other ways, the Argentine and Chilean 
cardinals also served the goal of reaching a peace.121 
C. Institutional and Structural Advantages of the Church 
Roman Catholics are superb at waiting. TI1e Church has 
waited almost two thousand years for the second coming of 
Jesus Christ. The Church has waited centuries for the reunifica-
tion of the splintered factions of sects. It sometimes waits more 
than a hundred years for a final determination on a cause for 
canonization. It waits for sinners to reject falsehood and em-
brace truth. These are big things, and they take time. Because 
the stakes are so high, procedures that many believe to be pains-
takingly slow and detailed have become inextricably woven into 
the mindset of the Church. As Sir D' Arey Osborne noted: 
Not only is the atmosphere of the Vatican supernatural and univer-
sal ... but it is also fourth,dimensional, and so to speak, outside of 
time ... for example, they can regard the Savoy dynasty as an inter-
lude, and the Fascist era as an incident, in the history of Rome and 
Italy. They reckon in centuries and plan for eternity and this inevita-
bly renders their policy inscrutable, confusing, and, on occasion, 
repre-hensible to practical and time'conditioned minds,128 
The Church, then, possesses a different sense of time and 
history than most other mediating bodies. 
123. See PASSARELLI, supra note 3, at 100-01. 
124. See id. at 118-19. 
125. See id. at 150; Patrick J. 11mrston, The Developme11t of Religious Liberty in 
Chile, 1973-2000, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1185, 1201-29; TAPIA, supra note 3, at 216 
(describing activity of Chilean nuncio \Vith Pinochet.to advance peaceful settlement). 
126. See PAssARELLT, supra note 3-, at 258. 
127. See TAPlA, supra.note-'3, at _133. 
128. SIR D'Aacv OsBoRNE, British Ambassador to the Holy See, March 1947, 
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The Vatican's approach to the Beagle Channel mediation 
reflected this worldview. Samore's procedures included many 
separate meetings with each side, with face-to-face meetings re-
served only for issues that were not contentious. The stances of 
each side were written in detailed position statements.1w This 
not only served the Vatican mediation team in gathering infor-
mation and assessing positions, but also offered the parties the 
opportunity to commit to and to solidify their views. The use of 
position statements has been criticized for their tendency to lock 
parties inflexibly into a particular stance, and. thus make negoti-
ation towards common ground more difficult.13° Thomas 
Princen correctly observes that such written position statements 
are "standard operating procedure for the Holy See," but upon 
closer examination there is something institutionally deeper 
here.131 The reliance on written position statements stems from 
both historical and present-day methods of truth seeking in ca-
non law and theology in the Roman. Catholic Church. First, 
from the perspective of canon law, written statements are con-
sistent with the standard method of canonical procedure. In ca-
non law, disputes are initiated and responded to by writings. 
Evidence is collected i:n written statements often based on writ-
ten questions. Judges usually rely exclusively on the written re-
cord to produce written decisions. 132 For priests familiar with 
canon law and called to produce a written treaty (similar to a 
canonical sentence), the written position statement is the most 
obvious starting point. Second, from the perspective of theolog-
ical debate, the error reflected in a written work becomes the 
raw material upon which the process of correction can be im-
posed. The Scholastic method, second nature to theologians and 
canon lawyers, requires a proposition to be disputed. As Harold 
Berman writes, "[t ]he method is called 'dialectical' in the 
twelfth-century sense of that word, meaning that it seeks the 
reconciliation of opposites. "133 The task before . these priests 
trained in the Scholastic method was reconciling the opposite 
positions of Argentina and Chile. Position statements were the 
129. See Princen, Mediation, supra note 5, at 351-52. 
130. See PRINCEN,, INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 1, at 177; Princen, Mediation, 
supra note 5, at 360-61. 
131. PRINCEN, lNTERMEOIARIES, supra note 1, at-178. 
132. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LA\V AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION 9F THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 250-52 (1983). 
133. Id. at 131. 
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raw material upon which the Scholastic method could be 
worked to reach a peaceful solution. Princen has observed that, 
consistent with the needs of the two parties, the method pro-
vided a highly formal and organized structure to the negotia-
tion.'34 It is not surprising that Samore, with doctorates in both 
theology and canon law, applied his trainingin these fields to 
structure the resolution of an international dispute.135 
While this method was time-consuming, it appears that the 
Church saw little problem in delay. Each day of negotiation, 
each day of preparing position statements, was a day of peace. 
Princen states one positive aspect ·Of this method was "to keep 
the parties busy."136 Delay provided an opportunity for 
favorable internal changes in the disputing countries.1.37 Thus, a 
long period of negotiation, during which no decision was 
reached, was acceptable. Patience turned out to be an essential 
attribute for the Vatican team.138 Indeed, the willingness to con-
tinue mediation over six years, even when no movement in posi-
tions was expected, led to a six-year period of peace,139 
The institutional aloofness of the Vatican was a valuable at-
tribute in its role as a mediator. While this quality supported its 
neutrality towards the parties, it also meant that the Vatican 
would not easily be swayed by outside interests. Its religious 
interest in a peaceful and lasting reconciliation between the par-
ties was its primary goal. As an institution, the Vatican has long 
withstood public pressure against and disenchantment with its 
actions and positions. IIl the face of broad and forceful criticism 
by much of the modern world, Vatican priests must individually 
stand up for their faith and defend the Church's position. 
Samore and other members of the negotiating team were appro-
priately detached from outside criticism concerning their se-
lected procedures and methods of handling the mediation. 
Fmally, the Vatican offered a well-oiled bureaucratic ma-
chine. Indeed, it is staffed with professionals of the highest cali-
ber accustomed to dealing with matters of the utmost 
134. See Princen, Media_tion, supra note 5, at 361. 
135. See TAPIA, supra note 3, at 171. 
136. -PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES, supra not~_ 1, at 182. 
137. See Princen, Mediation, si,pra note 5,: at 364. 
138. Patience is one of the fruits of the Holy Spirit. See CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 79, at §§ 736, 1832. 
139. See Princen, Medi'ation, supra note 5, at 364. 
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seriousness. For example, the Vatican could control and shape 
the negotiation process with adept skill. It was used to dealing 
with secular power, to afford it appropriate diplomatic respect, 
and to criticize it from the superior position of religious truth. It 
also provides its own counterweight of history, power, and maj-
esty. For example, in 1980, whenJohn Paul II made his proposal 
for a resolution of the conflict, the delivery of his solution was 
made in person, in a solemn ceremony in the Consistorial Hall 
of the Apostolic Palace - an impressive location by anyone's 
standards.140 
V. THE CHURCH'S AGENDA IN MEDIATION 
The Church's main goal in intervention and mediation was 
the preservation of peace between countries claiming a common 
faith. Making peace is central to the religious mission of the 
Church.141 Beyond reaching a peaceful solution, the Church 
may have had other things to gain by successful mediation. A 
successful resolution would have greatly increased the interna-
tional stature of both the Vatican and the new Pope, John Paul 
II. During the time of the dispute in the region, the Church's 
social conscience had been brought under close scrutiny by the 
rise of liberation theology. By maintaining peace between the 
countries and asserting its position against military governments 
of questionable validity, the Church expanded its activities in 
the region. The Church's actions may have even risen to the 
level of institutional atonement to these countries' poor who 
suffered most under Argentina and Chile's purges of commu-
nists and dissidents. The Church's complex and multilevel re-
sponses of objection to, dissent from, silence about, and 
complicity with these countries' governments and their atrocities 
are beyond the scope of this work.142 Nonetheless, all would 
agree that the Church's actions were less than perfect in re-
sponse to such events. Furthermore, the Church sought pro-
gress on this issue. The Church's place in Latin American 
society and politics was to be addressed at the Third General 
140. See BENADAVA, supra note 3, at 84, and -pholq preceding 57; PASSARELLI, 
supra note 3, at 177. 
141. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
142. See COLLIER & SATER, supra ilOte 112, at 361-62; FEITLO\VITZ, supra note 
109, at 219-23. 
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Assembly of the Latin American Episcopate in January, 1979.143 
A war between Argentina and Chile, and perhaps spreading 
throughout the entire region, would have greatly undermined 
any possible progress of a general assembly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Vatican's intervention in the Beagle Channel dispute 
offers an opportunity to see one instance of successful faith-
based international action by the Roman Catholic Church. 
Consistent with the Church's mission of making peace, the Vati-
can brought several unusual attributes to the process of media-
tion. These included the religious authority of the Church, the 
ability to control information regarding the mediation, neutral-
ity stemming from its lack of military and earthly ambitions, and 
highly trained and patient bureaucratic machinery accustomed 
to dealing with power and evil. 
These attributes make the Church an ideal actor for inter-
national peace in disputes between countries that are predomi-
nantly Roman Catholic. The resolution of the conflict between 
Argentina and Chile by the Vatican was greatly aided by the 
countries' historical, political, and popular ties to the Church. 
Where different religions or faiths underlie a dispute, interven-
tion by an organized representative of the faith of one party will 
be seen as lacking impartiality. Where Roman Catholicism pre-
dominates, such as in the countries of Latin America, the Vati-
can is aware of the special contribution it may make to maintain 
and create peace. In a letter to the United Nations, John Paul II 
noted these possibilities.144 The Organization of American 
States is also aware of the unique service the Vatican can offer 
in such situations.145 In fact, the Beagle Channel dispute was 
not the first time in the twentieth century that Vatican interven-
tion brought peaceful solutions to international problems in 
Latin America.146 The Vatican served to facilitate Manuel 
Antonio Noriega's safe and peaceful relocation to the United 
States for trial.147 In 1965, a papal nuncio helped establish a 
143. See Laudy, supra note 6, at 305. 
144. See Lindsley, supra note 6, at 453. 
145. See id. at 454. · 
146. See Apollis, supra note 4, at 333-35. 
147. See James A.R. Nafziger, The F11nctions of Reli!fion in the lllfernational Le-
gal Systenz, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LA\V, supra note 74, at 170w71. 
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cease-fire in the Dominican Republic.1•s As other conflicts and 
disputes arise in the region, it is hoped that world leaders, inter-
national organizations, and the Vatican itself remember the 
successes of the Beagle Channel intervention and the unique re-
ligious perspective and tools the Vatican might bring to peace-
making in Latin America. 
148. See William P. George, Looking for a Global Ethic? Tiy Intemationa/ Law, 
in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 74, at 495. 
